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Sexual images depicting children: the EU




Sexual(ised) images of children may often be posted or shared on social network sites or content
sharing platforms. While such material may be the result of abuse or coercion, evidence shows
that  it  may  often  be  linked  to  contemporary  forms  of  sexual  exploration  or  intimate
communication among underage peers. The aim of this paper is to explore the boundaries of the
EU legal and policy framework regulating online platforms' liability for hosting or not removing
such imagery. Discussing popular online platforms' policies against their imposed responsibility
to contribute to the fight against illegal child sexual abuse material (CSAM) revealed a tendency
of online intermediaries to restrict more than legally required from them. However justifiable
the adoption of this 'better safe than sorry' approach might be, it sparks additional controversy
in relation to children's agency. Navigating between the protection and freedom of children,
when  the  issue  at  stake  associates  with  elements  such  as  gender,  morality,  and  culture,
inherently  perplexes  the  performed  balancing  and  cannot  guarantee  easy  public  policy  or
private  industry  solutions.  However,  in  the  absence  of  clear  and  sufficient  policy
guidelines,online platforms have no other choice but to shape their policies based on popular
cultural norms, their business plan, and their understanding of how sensitive content should be
dealt with.
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1. Introduction
1.1 BACKGROUND
Online  platforms  are  considered  great  contributors  to  innovation  and  growth  within  the
European  Digital  Single  Market  (European  Commission,  2018b).  Search  engines,  social
networks,  micro-blogging  sites,  or  video-  and  image-sharing  platforms  as  well  as  direct
messaging app(lication)s mediate the access of internet users to information and digital material
(European Commission, 2017b). Individuals of all ages make use of apps and websites in order
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to communicate thoughts and content they have created; alternatively, they navigate the online
environment in quest of material and information of their interest.
In their role as facilitators of the online environment, however, online platforms may not only
host legitimate exchanges, but may also serve as channels for the communication of illegal and
harmful content. More precisely, internet users might express and access illegal hate speech or
content that incites to terrorism, as well as access, transfer and download child sexual abuse
material (CSAM) (European Commission, 2017b).
In the European Union (EU), concerns about the increasing availability of illegal content online
have recently led to the adoption of non-binding guidelines and principles concerning the role of
intermediaries  in  the  fight  against  the  online  circulation  of  illegal  content  (European
Commission, 2018b). Beyond the legally binding framework regarding intermediaries,  which
has  been  in  place  since  2000  and  puts  the  focus  on  the  exemption  of  certain  categories  of
intermediaries from liability, and in line with the ever-growing number of users, over the last
few  years  social  media  and  other  online  platforms  have  been  assigned  particular  societal
responsibilities to assist this fight. Ever since 2015, the European Commission has systematically
scaled up its actions towards tackling illegal content online (European Commission, 2018a) and
has adopted a number of policy documents that describe the liability and responsibility of online
platforms to control the content they host.
The focus of this article lays on the online availability and exchange of content that depicts
children  in  a  sexual(ly  suggestive)  way.  Such content  usually  qualifies  as  illegal  CSAM (as
explicitly stated in a number of legislative and policy documents) and therefore its production,
possession and dissemination are criminalised both by state- as well as EU- level legislation (see
EU Directive 2011/93). In light of emerging trends of (children's) sexual exploration by means of
information  and  communication  technology  -  such  as  sexting  among  peers  (Lanzarote
Committee, 2019b; Livingstone, Mascheroni, & Staksrud, 2018; Walrave, Van Ouytsel, Ponnet,
Temple, 2018) - the boundaries between the legal and illegal nature of sexual imagery depicting
children are, however, increasingly blurred (Lanzarote Committee, 2019a). Sexual or sexually
suggestive imagery may not always be the result of coercion or harassment; research shows that
sexual images of children may be exchanged among young individuals on a consensual basis
within intimate relationships or as a form of exploration of sexuality (Livingstone et al., 2018;
Madigan, Ly, Rash, Van Ouytsel, & Temple, 2018; Van Ouytsel, Walrave, & Ponnet, 2018a).
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Whether material depicting children in a sexual way qualifies as legal or illegal cannot always be
established with certainty.  This  results  in a lack of  clarity  as to the applicability  of  existing
legislation  and  non-binding  policy  documents  and  as  to  how  they  both  shape  the
liability/responsibility  of  platforms respectively.  More  specifically,  questions arise  regarding
whether an online platform should be held liable for hosting or not removing such content.
To that end, the article aims at, first to explore the possibly applicable EU legislation (and non-
binding policies) on the hosting of material depicting children in a sexual(ly) suggestive way
and  online  platforms'  relevant  policies.  Subsequently  the  extent  to  which  the  platforms'
approach reflects their obligations as laid down in the legislation shall be examined, and arising
legal and societal controversies shall be discussed.
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1.3 METHODOLOGY
In terms of methodology, the paper is based on traditional desk research. With regard to the first
research question, legislation, in particular the EU Directive 2000/31 ('E-Commerce Directive'),
and (non-binding) policy documents on the liability of intermediaries at a European Union level
served as the basis of the conducted research. At the same time, the EU Directive 2011/93 on
combating  the  child  sexual  abuse  and  exploitation  and  on  child  sexual  abuse  material
contributed to delineating the liability of online platforms in relation to the material in question.
The second research question was approached through a textual  analysis  of  the Terms and
Conditions and Community Guidelines of selected online platforms on which the material in
question could be made available, stored or exchanged. The selection of platforms, the policy of
which was scrutinised, was based on their popularity among users as well as the reported use
thereof  as hosting platforms for such online exchanges.  Facebook,  Instagram, Snapchat,  and
YouTube constitute the basis of the relevant analysis.
These two parts are followed by a discussion, consisting of a critical analysis of online platforms'
policies against the applicable legal framework. Subsequently, the author attempts to discuss
shortcomings of the latter as well  as explore nuances and issues arising from the platforms'
interpretation of the law and conception of their 'duty of care' in the fight against the online
circulation of child sexual abuse material. While the communication of intimate material such as
sexual  or  sexually  suggestive  images  (of  children)  raises  data  protection-related  issues,  a
relevant discussion falls outside the scope of the present article. In fact, the author chooses to
explore children's right to respect for private life in a broader, more principled sense, and in
relation to their right to image, self-representation, and freedom of expression.
2. Liability of intermediaries with regard to sexual images
of  and  by  children  -  the  EU  legislative  and  policy
framework
Identifying the legal landscape within which the liability of intermediaries with reference to
sexual images depicting children is shaped, requires us to draw on two separate EU sets of
legislative and policy instruments. On the one hand, the EU legal framework on the production,
possession and dissemination of sexual images depicting children sets boundaries between legal
and illegal behaviour in relation to material depicting children. On the other hand, the EU legal
and  policy  framework  on  the  liability  of  intermediaries  is  key  to  ascertaining  platforms'
responsibilities and liability in relation to content they host.
2.1  THE  EU  LEGAL FRAMEWORK  ON  THE  PRODUCTION,  POSSESSION
AND DISSEMINATION OF SEXUAL IMAGES DEPICTING CHILDREN
Imagery  that  depicts  children  in  a  sexual  or  sexually  suggestive  way  might  fall  under  the
definition of 'child pornography', as laid down in multiple supranational as well as national
legal  instruments (see also EU Directive 2011/93). While this term is  widely used in legally
binding  and  non-binding  policy  documents,  terminology  considerations  have  been  strongly
voiced over the past few years. Clarification is provided for by the Interagency Working Group
in Luxembourg, which adopted Terminology Guidelines for the Protection of Children from
Sexual  Exploitation  and  Sexual  Abuse  (widely  known as  'Luxembourg Guidelines')  in  2016
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(Interagency  Working  Group on Sexual  Exploitation  of  Children,  2016).  Criticism  is  mainly
focused  on  the  fact  that  'pornography'  is  increasingly  normalised  and  may  [subsequently]
contribute to diminishing the gravity of, trivialising, or even legitimising what is actually sexual
abuse  and/or  sexual  exploitation  of  children  (Frangež  et  al.,  2016).  Thus,  following  the
Luxembourg  Guidelines  (pp.  38-40),  the  term 'child  sexual  abuse  material'  (CSAM) is  used
throughout this paper in replacement of the term 'child pornography'.
At the EU level, the Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on combating the child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and
child  pornography  (European  Parliament  and  Council,  2011),  is  the  relevant  instrument
regarding  CSAM.  Core  aims  of  the  legislator  are  the  prevention  and  combat  of  sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse of children, the protection of the rights of the child victims of
sexual  exploitation  and  sexual  abuse  and  the  promotion  of  national  and  international
cooperation against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children.
According to Article 5 of the Directive, intentionally acquiring, possessing, knowingly obtaining
access,  distributing,  disseminating,  transmitting,  offering,  supplying,  making  available  or
producing child sexual abuse material ought to be punishable. As laid down in Article 2, 'child
pornography' is defined as:
any material that visually depicts a child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit conduct;
any depiction of the sexual organs of a child for primarily sexual purposes;
any material that visually depicts any person appearing to be a child engaged in real
or simulated sexually explicit conduct or any depiction of the sexual organs of any
person appearing to be a child, for primarily sexual purposes;
or any realistic images of a child engaged in sexually explicit  conduct or realistic
images of the sexual organs of a child, for primarily sexual purposes.
Paragraph 3 of Article 8, however, introduces a possibility for Member States to decriminalise
certain  behaviours  that  otherwise  would  qualify  as  criminal  offences,  insofar  as  certain
conditions are met. More specifically, the legislator leaves it
to the discretion of Member States to decide whether Article 5(2) and (6) [making sure that the
respective  behaviours  are  punishable  within  the  national  legal  framework]  apply  to  the
production, acquisition or possession of material involving children who have reached the age
of sexual consent  where that  material  is  produced and possessed with the consent of  those
children and only for the private use of the persons involved, in so far as the acts did not involve
any abuse. [2]
Notably,  despite  the existence of  Article  8(3),  only a few EU Member States  have explicitly
decriminalised  the  described  behaviour;  the  majority  of  EU  Member  States  have  made  no
alterations to their criminal legislation, yet clarify that in practice no prosecution of children
shall take place if such behaviour occurs (Chatzinikolaou & Lievens, 2020).
Finally, Article 25 was introduced in order to disrupt the availability of CSAM online. Among
other, hosting service providers are considered well placed to cooperate in the implementation
of Article  25 (European Commission, 2016d,  p.  5),  a  provision underlining the need for the
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adoption of measures (according to Recital 47 not necessarily legislative) leading to the removal
of unlawful content or the blocking of access to it. According to Article 25, [3]
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt removal of web pages
containing or disseminating child pornography hosted in their territory and to endeavour to
obtain the removal of such pages hosted outside of their  territory.  Member States may take
measures to block access to web pages containing or disseminating child pornography towards
the Internet users within their territory.
2.2  THE  EU  LEGAL  FRAMEWORK  ON  THE  LIABILITY  OF
INTERMEDIARIES
The liability of online intermediaries is regulated by the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council of the EU on certain legal aspects of information society services,
and more specifically on electronic commerce in the Internal Market, widely referred to as the E-
Commerce Directive (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2000). In addition,
the European Commission demonstrates its engagement in promoting the regulation of online
content and the responsibilities of platforms through two recent policy documents elaborated
upon in  this  subsection.  In  line  with  the  E-Commerce  Directive  and the  relevant  European
Commission non-binding policy documents aiming to enhance platforms' responsibilities, the
2018 revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) (European Parliament and
Council of the EU) lays down measures to be taken by video-sharing platform providers with
regard to content  they may host,  without prejudice to Articles 12 to 15 of  the E-Commerce
Directive (Article 28b of the AVMSD).
2.2.1 E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE
According to the preamble of the E-Commerce Directive, its goal was to create a basic legal
framework which would remove obstacles to cross-border online services in the EU and provide
legal  certainty  to  business  and  citizens  in  cross-border  transactions.  To  that  end,  certain
categories of intermediaries are exempted from liability resulting from the illegal nature of the
information provided by the recipient of the service under certain conditions that are laid down
in Articles 12 - 15 of the E-Commerce Directive.
The  E-Commerce  Directive  applies  to  'information  society  services',  meaning  'any  service
normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual
request  of  a  recipient  of  services'  (pursuant  to  the  definition  of  Article  1(2)  of  Directive
98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC).  Pursuant to Article 2(b) of the E-Commerce
Directive, a 'service provider' is 'any natural or legal person providing an information society
service'. According to recent case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), 'it is common
ground' that social media platforms - such as Facebook - 'provide the services of a host provider
for  the  purposes  of  Article  14  of  Directive  2000/31'  (Judgment  of  3  October  2019, Eva
Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited , C-18/18, EU:C:2019:821, paragraph 22).
Articles 12-14 do not lay down legal grounds for the establishment of liability; on the contrary,
they describe the circumstances under which exemption from liability applies. The nature of the
provisions is horizontal in the sense that (a) they cover different types of illegal content and
activities (such as content that infringes defamation laws, provisions on the protection of minors,
privacy  laws  or  commercial  practices)  and  (b)  they  cover  different  kinds  of  liability  (both
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criminal or civil and direct or indirect) (Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., 2008, p. 220). The liability
exemptions  offered  through  articles  12,  13  and  14  apply  to  intermediaries  providing  'mere
conduit' (Article 12; an information society service is provided that consists of the transmission
in  a  communication  network  of  information  provided  by  a  recipient  of  the  service,  or  the
provision of access to a communication network), 'caching' (Article 13; an information society
service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information
provided by a recipient of the service), and 'hosting' services (Article 14; an information society
service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the
service).  As  already  stated  above,  the  CJEU  has  by  now  established  that  social  network
platforms  qualify  as  hosting  intermediaries  and  therefore  can  benefit  from  the  liability
exemption of the provision (see C-18/18; Judgment of 16 February 2012, SABAM v Netlog , C-
360/10, EU:C:2012:85, paragraph 27).
Moreover, pursuant to Article 15,
Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services
covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a
general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
This basic principle allows for Member States to delineate and specify duties of care that are
expected from intermediaries in their role to protect and prevent illegal activities, as described in
recital  48  (Koelman  & Julia-Barcelo,  2000).  Despite  the  explicit  reference  to  'duties  of  care',
applicable solely for the prevention and detection of certain types of illegal activities foreseen by
national  law,  neither  the  Directive  nor  the  CJEU  elucidate  the  meaning  of  this  concept
(Kuczerawy, 2019, p. 2). While Article 15 and the extent of the monitoring obligations that may
be  imposed  on  platforms by  Member  States  remains  a  debatable  point  in  need  for  further
clarification  (Kuczerawy,  2019),  the  CJEU  recently  provided  for  an  interpretation  of  the
provision.  In  the Eva  Glawischnig-Piesczek  v  Facebook  Ireland  Limited judgment  (C-18/18,
paragraph 53), the Court ruled that
Article 15(1), must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a court of a Member State
from: ordering a host provider to remove information which it stores, the content of which is
identical [or equivalent, when additional circumstances are met] to the content of information
which  was  previously  declared  to  be  unlawful,  or  to  block  access  to  that  information,
irrespective of who requested the storage of that information; and from ordering a host provider
to  remove  information  covered  by  the  injunction  or  to  block  access  to  that  information
worldwide within the framework of the relevant international law,
somewhat stretching the conception of monitoring that may be imposed on platforms. Anyhow,
tracking and removing content which is identical to content that has been found to be unlawful
is distinct from monitoring for unlawful content per se.
Given the focus of the article on online platforms on which sexual imagery depicting children
might be stored and made available to users, the analysis is centred on Articles 14 and 15 and
the liability regime for hosting intermediaries.
According to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive,
information service providers whose (a) service consists of the storage of information (hosting
service) and who (b) have no actual knowledge of illegal activities or information (or, in case of
damages, of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent) or
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who, upon such knowledge act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information
(c) are not liable for information stored at the request of a recipient of that service.
Through  Article  14,  the  E-Commerce  Directive  introduces  a  notice-and-take-down/action
mechanism, the efficacy, proportionality and adequacy of which has been extensively debated
upon in literature (Kuczerawy, 2018a). As described in the provision, once a hosting service has
knowledge of infringing activities, it must act 'expeditiously' to remove or to disable access to
the infringing information.
2.2.2 AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA SERVICES DIRECTIVE (AVMSD)
While it does not regulate the liability of intermediaries per se, the AVMSD contributes to the
realisation of the 'enhanced liability regime' (European Commission, 2017b) for online platforms
(Montagnani, 2019). In particular, after the 2018 review, Article 28b, without prejudice to Articles
12 to 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, calls Member States
to  ensure  that  video-sharing  platform  providers  under  their  jurisdiction  take  appropriate
measures to protect [among other] the general public from programmes, user-generated videos
and audiovisual  commercial  communications containing content  the dissemination of  which
constitutes  an  activity  which  is  a  criminal  offence  under  Union  law,  namely  [..]  offences
concerning child pornography as set out in Article 5(4) of Directive 2011/93/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council.
2.2.3  NON-BINDING  EU  POLICY DOCUMENTS  ON  THE  RESPONSIBILITY OF ONLINE
PLATFORMS IN TACKLING ILLEGAL CONTENT ONLINE
In parallel to the E-Commerce Directive, the European Commission has drafted a number of
complementary non-binding documents that provide guidance to online service providers and
Member States on the role of the former as hosts of content generated by third parties. In fact,
the  European  Commission  has  recently  been  promoting  the  enhancement  of  their
'responsibilities' in dealing with illegal third party content (European Commission, 2015).
Firstly, in 2016, the European Commission drafted a Communication on Online Platforms and
the  Digital  Single  Market  (European Commission,  2016a).  Secondly,  the  Communication  on
Tackling Illegal  Content Online,  issued in September  2017,  includes a 'set  of  guidelines  and
principles for online platforms to step up the fight against illegal content online in cooperation
with  national  authorities,  Member  States  and  other  relevant  stakeholders' (European
Commission, 2017b). The Communication 'aims to facilitate and intensify the implementation of
good practices for preventing, detecting, removing and disabling access to illegal content so as to
ensure the effective removal of illegal content, increased transparency, and the protection of
fundamental rights online'.  Furthermore, it is meant to provide clarifications to platforms on
their liability when they take proactive steps to detect, remove or disable access to illegal content
(the so-called 'Good Samaritan' actions).
Thirdly,  building  on  this  Communication,  the  Commission  issued  a  Recommendation  on
measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (European Commission, 2018b), in which
once again CSAM is explicitly singled out. Among others, it is proposed that 'hosting service
providers  be  encouraged  to  take,  where  appropriate,  proportionate  and  specific  proactive
measures in respect of illegal content'. Such proactive measures may, for instance, involve the
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use of automated means for the detection as well as the prevention of the dissemination of such
material (European Commission, 2018b, p. 6). Hosting intermediaries are further encouraged to
collaborate closely with Member States, trusted flaggers (meaning an individual or entity which
is considered by a hosting service provider to have particular expertise and responsibilities for
the  purposes  of  tackling  illegal  content  online),  as  well  as  other  hosting  service  providers
(European Commission, 2018b, p. 13) in order to effectively remove or disable the access to
illegal content.
3.  Online  Platforms'  Policies  on  Sexual(ly  Suggestive)
Material Depicting Children
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Material  that  depicts  children  in  a  sexual  or  sexually  suggestive  way may  be  found on or
exchanged through different  types  of  online platforms,  be it  search  engines  and portals,  or
participative networking platforms -  such as  social  network  sites,  instant  messaging or  file-
sharing platforms (Sartor, 2017, p. 7). The posting or distribution of such imagery - including
videos - may be initiated by different parties and for a number of different purposes. To begin
with, (adult) perpetrators create, make available and distribute child sexual abuse material; the
digital depiction of child sexual abuse is widely communicated within the so called 'dark web',
through websites that are not accessible via standard browsers (Kobie, 2019). However, the focus
of  this  article  will  limit  itself  to  online  platforms that  operate  on  the  regular  web  and are
considered to play a key role in facilitating the digital economy and society and consequently
the EU Digital Single Market (European Commission, 2016a). The sending of self-made sexually
explicit  [text  messages],  images,  and videos  through the  computer  or  the  mobile  phone,  as
sexting  is  defined (Van  Ouytsel,  Walrave,  Ponnet,  &  Temple,  2018) , may  occur  among
individuals under the age of 18 years old on a consensual basis as a way to maintain or establish
romantic relationships (Burén & Lunde, 2018). In other words, children engage in consensual
sexting by using popular social media platforms and direct messaging apps (Van Ouytsel, Van
Gool, Walrave, Ponnet, & Peeters, 2017). It goes without saying, though, that such platforms
may be also engaged by third persons for the unauthorised forwarding or posting of material
that was initially created consensually by the depicted child. Finally, naked images of children
that portray their sexual organs are also posted on social media profiles by parents who wish to
casually and innocently share moments of their offspring's childhood (Steinberg, 2017).
Against  this  background,  the  Terms and Conditions  of  a  number of  online  platforms were
looked into. More precisely, their policy on allowing users to 'post' online sexual images (either
still  or  in  motion)  of  children  constitutes  the  core  of  the  analysis.  The  selection  of  online
platforms was based on their nature as possible hosts of sexual imagery depicting children, in
combination with their popularity among the internet users - be it children themselves or adults
-  who  may  engage  in  the  distribution  of  the  content  in  question,  as  portrayed  in  either
scholarship or the media(Anderson & Jang, 2018; Crofts, Lee, McGovern, & Miliovojevic, 2018;
Elgersma, 2019; Moreau, 2019; Ofcom, 2019). On the basis of these two selection criteria, the
following participative networking platforms (photo- and video-sharing sites and social network
sites) were chosen: Facebook (Elgersma, 2019; Ofcom, 2019, p. 8), Instagram (Ofcom, 2019, p. 8),
Snapchat  (Charteris  &  Gregory,  2018;  Piwek  &  Joinson,  2016),  and  YouTube  (reportedly
becoming the viewing platform of choice among children)(Ofcom, 2019, p. 5).
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3.2 ONLINE PLATFORMS' TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The relevant policies were searched for under the terms 'Community Standards' (Facebook), and
'Community  Guidelines'  (Instagram,  Snap  Inc,  YouTube).  First,  the  author  looked  for  the
platforms' rules on the posting of child sexual abuse material, sexualised images of children (that
do not represent the sexual abuse of children, see Luxembourg Guidelines, p. 42), and nude
imagery depicting children. Second, the sanction applied in case of a breach of the platform's
policy as well as the possibility for users to report restricted content which has been posted on
the platform were both looked into.
Facebook
The policy of Facebook on sexual images depicting children can be found under the section
'Community Standards' on the platform's website (Facebook, n.d.-a). More precisely, under the
subsection on 'Safety' one can find both the policy rationale and examples of restricted content in
relation to 'Child Nudity and Sexual Exploitation of Children'.  As described, content that  is
sexually  exploiting or  endangering children  is  not  allowed on Facebook.  Drawing from the
indicative list provided, Facebook users are not to post content that depicts participation in the
sexual exploitation of children, content (including photos, videos, real-world art, digital content
and text) that depicts - among other - any sexual activity among minors, or minors with sexual
elements (including focus on genitals) nor content that shows minors in a sexualised context.
Beyond material that represents children in a sexual or sexually abusive/exploitative manner,
Facebook also restricts content that depicts child nudity, meaning genitals (even when covered
or covered by transparent clothing), straight and/or fully bare back at close range, unshielded
female nipples for toddlers, children without clothes, from neck to knee, who are older than
toddlers as well as digitally generated images of naked minors, unless the image is intended for
health  or  educational  purposes.  As  explicitly  explained  by  the  platform,  even  though  it  is
understandable that  'sometimes people share nude images of  their  own children with good
intentions,  [Facebook] generally removes these images because of  the potential  for  abuse by
others  and  to  help  avoid  the  possibility  of  other  people  reusing  or  misappropriating  the
images'(Facebook, n.d.-a).
According to the 'Safety Center' section of the platform, in case a user would like to report the
existence  of  content  on  the  platform  which  violates  the  Community  Standards,  Facebook
includes a link on nearly every piece of content for reporting abuse, bullying, harassment and
other issues. When the platform becomes aware of apparent child exploitation, it reports it to the
United States (US) National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). [4]
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that according to the platform's community standards, nudity
and the representation of sexual activity involving adults is also restricted. Within the section
titled 'Objectionable Content' and under the subsection on 'Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity',
Facebook explains that the display of nudity or sexual activity is restricted all in all, as 'some
people in our [the Facebook] community may be sensitive to this type of content', and in order to
prevent the sharing of non-consensual or underage content(Stewart, 2017, p. 171). In this case,
however, the threshold between acceptable or non-acceptable adult nudity may vary pursuant
to cultural and social norms(Kuklis, 2019, p. 9). As stated explicitly by the platform, their 'nudity
policies have become more nuanced over the time', allowing for exceptions to the prohibition of
nude or sexual content sharing involving adults.
Instagram
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The policy of Instagram (which has been owned by Facebook since April 2012) on sexual images
depicting  children  can  be  found  on  the  'Privacy  and  Safety  Center'  page  of  the  platform's
website, a subsection of Instagram's Help Center, (Instagram, n.d.). Instagram offers guidance to
users with regard to 'pornography' involving children under the section 'Child Exploitation'. In a
'Question and Answer'  format,  the question 'What should I  do if  I  see images that sexually
exploit children (example: pornography) on Instagram?' is followed by the explicit warning that
'posting, sharing or downloading images that sexually exploit children for any reason can be
criminal' as well as that the platform 'reports all apparent child pornography to the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children'. Users are subsequently requested not to share or
comment on such material, to report it to the platform through the offered 'built-in reporting
options' (which are included in the list appearing on the Privacy and Safety page) and to notify
the NCMEC.
The basic principles by which the Instagram 'community' members must abide are laid down in
the platform's 'Community Guidelines'. Instagram has 'zero tolerance when it comes to sharing
sexual content involving minors or threatening to post intimate images of others'. Furthermore,
as explicitly described, 'Instagram is a reflection of our diverse community of cultures, ages and
beliefs'  and therefore  users  may 'post  photos  and videos that  are  appropriate  for  a  diverse
audience'.  According to the Guidelines,  while it  is acknowledged that 'there are times when
people might want to share nude images that are artistic or creative in nature, [..] for a variety of
reasons', nudity is not allowed on Instagram. The platform goes on to provide for examples of
restricted  material,  including  'photos,  videos,  and  some digitally-created  content  that  show
sexual  intercourse,  genitals,  and close-ups  of  fully-nude buttocks  or  some photos  of  female
nipples'.  Yet,  'photos  of  post-mastectomy  scarring  and  women  actively  breastfeeding  are
allowed'.
While the abovementioned policy of nudity restriction seems to make no distinction based on
whether  the  depicted  person  is  an  adult  or  a  child,  Instagram  further  acknowledges  the
phenomenon of 'sharenting', a term describing how parents share details about their children's
lives  online (Steinberg,  2017).  Users are warned 'that  there are times that for  safety reasons
pictures showing nude or partially nude children may be removed, even when shared with
good intentions'. As explained, their policy seeks to prevent 'the use of such content by others in
unanticipated ways'. Parents are then directed to the Instagram's 'tips for parents page', where
the reasons why an image of one's child posted by the parent may be removed from the platform
are listed.
In case a user breaches the platform's Guidelines, according to the Terms of Use, Instagram may
'removeany content or information shared on the Service if [they] believe that it violates these
Terms of Use, policies (including our Instagram Community Guidelines) or [they] are required
to  do  so  by  law'.  Alternatively,  in  the  case  of  'clear,  serious  or  repeated'  violation  thereof,
Instagram 'can refuse to provide or stop providing the service to the user'.
Snapchat
The policy of Snap Inc. (the company that has developed Snapchat) on imagery that depicts
children in a sexual way can be found under the section 'Community Guidelines' and 'Snap Inc.
Terms of Service' (Snap, n.d.). As regards the Terms of Service, a distinction is made based on
whether the users live in or outside the United States. In the latter case, and under the subtitle
'Safety',  the  company  explicitly  states  that  '[they]  try  hard  to  keep  their  services  safe'  and
subsequently explain that by using the services, individuals 'agree [among other] that they will
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not post content that contains pornography'. Moreover,  Snap Inc. puts forward a number of
Community Guidelines 'to support [their] mission by encouraging the broadest range of self-
expression while making sure Snapchatters can use our services safely every day'. To that end, a
separate  reference is  made to 'sexually explicit  content'.  At a  first  level,  Snap Inc.  'prohibits
accounts  that  promote  or  distribute  pornographic  content'  and  goes  on  to  clarify  that
'breastfeeding  and  other  depictions  of  nudity  in  non-sexual  contexts  are  not  considered
pornographic and are permitted on Snapchat' (Snap, n.d.). At a second level, according to the
Guidelines, users should 'never post, save, or send nude or sexual content involving anyone
under the age of 18 — even of oneself [and also] never ask a minor to send explicit imagery or
chats'.
The  company  generally  states  that  child  sexual  exploitation  is  reported  to  the  authorities,
without  however  providing additional,  more  detailed  information  on the  process  and their
collaboration  with  the  competent  authorities.  On the  same page,  users  are  informed of  the
possibility offered to them at all times to file a report with the company's safety team either by
using the in-app reporting feature or by completing a form, both of which are directly provided
for through hyperlinks. As a matter of fact, users are encouraged to visit the website's 'Privacy
Center' where the company's safety policy is further elaborated.
Snap Inc. reviews the filed reports and the safety team in charge determines whether a violation
of either the Terms of Service or the Guidelines has occurred. In such a case,  the offending
content  may  be  removed,  the  account  may  be  terminated  and/or  the  law  enforcement
authorities may be informed.
YouTube
The policy of YouTube (now operating as a subsidiary of Google) on sexual images depicting
children can be found on the 'Policies and Safety' page. One can then be easily directed to the
platform's  'Community  Guidelines',  and  specifically  the  guidelines  on  'nudity  and  sexual
content', the 'Safety Tools and Resources' and information on how to report content on YouTube
along with information on how YouTube enforces their Community Guidelines. As explained
both in written form and through a video, YouTube 'is not meant for pornography or sexually
explicit content'. YouTube provides for a long indicative list of content types/examples that are
not allowed on the platform, or that shall be otherwise age-restricted. The 'depiction of genitals,
breasts, or buttocks (clothed or unclothed) for the purpose of sexual gratification [as well as]
pornography depicting sexual acts, genitals, or fetishes for the purpose of sexual gratification'
are not allowed.
Furthermore, within their policy on 'Child Safety on YouTube', it is made clear that 'sexually
explicit content featuring minors and content that sexually exploits minors is not allowed on
YouTube'.  Examples  of  such  material  would  be  a  video  featuring  minors  engaged  in
provocative, sexual, or sexually suggestive activities, challenges and dares, such as kissing or
groping ora video that advertises sexual content featuring minors. Users are warned that content
containing child sexual abuse imagery are reported to the US NCMEC (who work with global
law  enforcement  agencies).  In  fact,  users  are  repeatedly  encouraged  to  'flag'  content  that
(possibly)  violates  the  Community  Guidelines,  through  the  report  button  offered  on  every
YouTube video. Alternatively, the platform offers additional options for reporting, including the
'Reporting Tool', which is appropriate for a more detailed and extensive report for review.
YouTube staff review reports on a 24/7 basis; once it is determined that the content in question
violates the Guidelines, the content is removed and the individual is notified accordingly. The
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platform  'has  zero  tolerance  for  predatory  behaviour  on  YouTube'  and  informs  users  that
assistance is provided to law enforcement agencies in investigations, insofar as it is believed that
a child is in danger.
4. Discussion
4.1  INFORMATION  SOCIETY  SERVICES  PROVIDERS,  INTERMEDIARIES,
ONLINE PLATFORMS - DEFINITIONAL CONFUSION
A first finding relates to the definitional confusion caused by the use of different terms across
policy documents and legislative instruments with reference to notions that seem to (at least
partly)  overlap.  The  E-Commerce  Directive  makes  reference  to information  society  services
providers (for  instance,  Article  2)  or intermediary  service  providers (for  instance,  recital  45),
while scholars simply use the term '(online/internet) intermediaries' (Frosio, 2017; Kuczerawy,
2018b).  More  recently,  however,  a  shift  has  been  made  towards  the  use  of  the  term online
platforms (Bevolder,  2019;  European  Commission,  2015;  Sartor,  2017),  a  term  quite  loosely
defined (Taddeo & Floridi, 2017, p. 327). Despite the absence of consensus on a possible legal
definition of online platforms (European Commission, 2016b), in its Communication on online
platforms  (2016),  the  European  Commission  indicatively  lists  online  advertising  platforms,
marketplaces, search engines, social media and creative content outlets, application distribution
platforms,  communications  services,  payment  systems,  and  platforms  for  the  collaborative
economy as online platforms.
The E-Commerce Directive is considered the key legislative instrument for the regulation of
their operation and liability regime (European Commission, 2016a, 2017b, 2018b), yet the lack of
a coherent and consistent definition may cause further confusion in relation to the scope and
applicability of legislative and policy instruments.
4.2 IS THE LIABILITY EXEMPTION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE E-COMMERCE
DIRECTIVE  APPLICABLE  TO  ONLINE  PLATFORMS  ON  WHICH  SEXUAL
IMAGES DEPICTING CHILDREN MAY BE STORED?
While the application of the E-Commerce Directive to all platforms discussed above is widely
acknowledged (European Commission, 2017b, 2018b; Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al., 2008; Sartor,
2017),  whether  they  benefit  from  the  liability  exemption  offered  in  Article  14  is  less
straightforward.  Looking  back  at  the  wording  of  the  provision  reveals  key  elements  that
determine when the platform may benefit from the liability exemption; the platform ought to
qualify as a 'hosting information society service provider', the activity or information stored on
the platform ought to be illegal, and the platform ought to have no actual knowledge of illegal
activity or information that they store or upon obtaining such knowledge acts expeditiously to
remove or to disable access to the information. Yet, the issue of when these conditions are met
has been an object of dispute in academia as well as in case law ever since the introduction of the
E-Commerce Directive, and especially after the emergence of new types of online platforms over
the past decade (Kuczerawy, 2018; Koelman & Julia-Barcelo, 2000; Le Borgne-Bachschmidt et al.,
2008; Sartor, 2017; van Hoboken, 2012). Ever since the E-Commerce Directive entered into force,
the European Commission has recurrently assessed the adequacy and implementation of the
Directive  and  the  liability  regime  put  forth,  including  through  the  launch  of  a  public
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consultation  on  the  Regulatory  Environment  for  Platforms,  Online  Intermediaries  andthe
Collaborative Economy (European Commission, 2017a; Frosio, 2017). Whilst the E-Commerce
Directive  still  remains  the  key  regulatory  instrument  for  the  liability  of  intermediaries,  the
debate on its adequacy shall be reopened at a legislative level through a new Digital Services Act
(which  'will  upgrade liability  and safety  rules  for  digital  platforms,  services  and products')
announced by the European Commission's President-elect in her Agenda for the new term of the
European Commission (von der Leyen, 2019, p. 13).
4.2.1 NATURE OF THE INTERMEDIARY: PASSIVE OR ACTIVE?
Applying the liability exception of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive presupposes a clear
understanding of  its  scope,  with  the  nature  of  the  intermediary  being  a  crucial  element  to
consider. While the concept of a hosting service provider is at first sight delineated in the E-
Commerce  Directive  itself  through  Article  14  and  Recital  42,  what  types  of  intermediaries
qualify as hosting intermediaries is strongly debated upon in literature (Kuczerawy, 2018b; Van
Eecke & Truyens, 2014).
For now, light  has been shed on the scope of  Article  14  through the case law of  the CJEU
(Bevolder,  2019,  p.  23);  the  Court  has  ruled that  social  media  platforms,  such as  Facebook,
( SABAM v Netlog , C-360/10; Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited , C-18/18)
as well as search engines ('in the case where that service provider has not played an active role
of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data stored'; Judgment of 23 March
2010; Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others,  C-236/08
to C-238/08, EU:C:2010:159) fall within the meaning of 'hosting service providers' of Article 14.
As set out in the E-Commerce Directive (Recital 42), hosting services are only services whose
activities  are  'of  a  mere  technical,  automatic  and  passive  nature,  which  implies  that  the
information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information
which is transmitted or stored'. On the basis of the expansive application of Recital 42 by the
CJEU, a distinction between passive and active hosting has been established. After the CJEU
rulings in Google France and Google v Luis Vuitton Malletier a.o ., Joint Cases C-236/08 to C-
238/08  (paragraphs  113-114)  and L'Oréal  v  eBay ,  Case  C-324/09  (paragraphs  112-116),  the
exemption of Article 14 applies to hosting intermediaries as long as their role is restricted to
being sufficiently  passive.  The  restrictive  nature  of  Article's  14  interpretation  has  attracted
abundant criticism (Kuczerawy, 2018c; Sartor, 2017; Patrick Van Eecke, 2011). In fact, according
to Van Eecke (2011), as opposed to Recital 43 (which describes not being involved in any way
with the transmitted information as a condition for applying the liability exemption to mere-
caching and conduit services),  benefiting from the liability exemption of Article 14 does not
require a passive role on behalf of the platform. The so called 'storage but no knowledge test'
draws  a  line  for  benefiting  from  the  liability  exemption  on  the  basis  of  not  having  actual
knowledge over the data stored (Kuczerawy & Ombelet, 2015).
In practice however, liability immunity is conditioned upon passivity on behalf of the platform,
the practical meaning of which remains blurred. On the one hand, taking an increasingly active
role  regarding  the  way  in  which  platforms  offer  their  services  to  users  may  fall  within  a
platform's freedom to conduct business, which has been repeatedly acknowledged in relation to
hosting service providers by the CJEU (see, for instance, SABAM v Netlog, C-360/10, paragraph
42; Sartor, 2017, p. 22). Contributing to framing the way in which user-created content is created
or accessed (through, for instance, indexing, prioritising or linking) is usually of instrumental
value for the main function of  the platform. Social  networks,  for  instance,  decide on which
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content receives prominence in a user's feed or suggest links to users on the basis of similar
interests. In a similar way, search engines and portals index the content that has been uploaded
by users in a way that would make their navigation easier and more attractive, still without
actually creating the content itself.  In  other  words,  a  certain degree of  initiative or editorial
discretion is necessary for an intermediary to carry out core functions to its users (Yoo, 2012).
On  the  other  hand  it  remains  unclear  whether  the  adoption  of  proactive  measures  render
intermediaries active, and therefore obstruct them from benefiting from the liability exemption
(Kuczerawy, 2018c). While the distinction between active and passive intermediaries still holds,
the  recent  policy  documents  published  by  the  European  Commission,  namely  the
Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online and the Recommendation on measures to
Effectively  Tackle  Illegal  Content  Online,  set  forth  the  enhancement  of  online  platforms'
responsibilities and their role in fighting illegal content online. As KUCZERAWY aptly notes,
the relevant policy discourse has steadily shifted from liability (relating to a negligence-based
approach)  to  responsibility  (emphasising the need for proactive measures)  of  intermediaries
(2019). The European Commission is requiring a more active role from online platforms, which
should still be in conformity with the prohibition of introducing a general monitoring obligation
- as set out in Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive. Yet at the same time, it explicitly states
that 'the mere fact that an intermediary hosting service provider takes certain measures relating
to the provision of its services in a general manner does not necessarily mean that it plays an
active role in respect of the individual content items it stores'. As expressed by legal scholars,
whether the CJEU 'would agree that employing proactive measures to detect and remove illegal
content as an enforcement of the terms of service is similarly passive as merely setting the terms
of service' is highly questionable (Kuczerawy, 2018c).
A clarification on how wide the liability exemption is, which would explicitly expand its scope
as to cover 'active' intermediaries insofar as they are clearly not the creators of the content, is
timely and much awaited (Kuczerawy, 2018c). In the author's opinion, the sensitivity of material
that illustrates children in a sexual manner, coupled with the great uncertainty as to whether
allowing it on the platform triggers liability, are sufficient grounds to justify the 'better safe than
sorry'  approach  adopted  by  both  popular  search  engines  and  participative  networking
platforms.
4.2.2 NATURE OF THE MATERIAL: ILLEGAL OR LEGAL?
The nature and business model of the online platforms listed above may vary, however they
appear to have both a common purpose - the sharing and dissemination of content to the public
(French Government,  2019) -  and a quite uniform approach towards hosting sexual imagery
depicting children.
For online intermediaries to be held liable for user-created content they may host, the digital
material in question needs to be classified as illegal pursuant to the applicable national legal
framework. Whereas the determination of the illegality of a certain type of content often requires
a  case-by-case  assessment  against  the  legal  framework in  place,  there  seems to  be absolute
consensus  across  EU  Member  States  that  child  sexual  abuse  (CSAM)  and  child  sexual
exploitation material (CSEM) constitutes illegal content, and therefore behaviour relating to the
material ought to be punishable (see Directive 2011/93 and the criminalisation of the intentional
production, possession, acquisition and dissemination of child sexual abuse material, Article 5).
Without  exception,  the  policy  section  of  all  four  platforms  makes  explicit  reference  to  the
prohibition of CSAM - often referred to by the term 'child pornography' - and CSEM. Against
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this  background, the uniform approach detected across online platform, according to which
child sexual abuse material is prohibited, is aligned with the legislation in place.
At a second glance, though, one realises that determining what constitutes (illegal) child sexual
abuse material  is  in  fact  not  as  straightforward.  In  fact,  EUROPOL has acknowledged how
challenging  it  is  to  reliably  discriminate  between  consensual  and  non-consensual  types  of
behaviours in cases of 'youth-produced sexual content' (2017). The increasing trend of creating
and distributing such material, meaning 'nude or semi-nude images or videos produced by a
young person of themselves engaging in erotic or sexual activity and intentionally shared by
electronic means' (Internet Watch Foundation, 2015, p. 3),as well as Article 8(3) of the Directive
2011/93, blur the line between legal and illegal.
The adopted definition of child sexual abuse material in the Directive 2011/93 is the starting
point for defining the type of content platforms are required by law not to host. According to
Article 2, the definition of child sexual abuse material includes any material that visually depicts
a child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit  conduct or any depiction of the sexual
organs of a child for primarily sexual purposes .
A few observations  should  be  made  on the  legal  qualification  of  sexual  imagery  involving
children. Firstly, despite the broadness of the definition [5] - at least at EU level - the depiction of
a child's  sexual organs constitutes illegal child sexual abuse material insofar as it  occurs for
'primarily sexual purposes'. It emerges from the definition included in the Directive 2011/93,
that the context in which the images are taken as well  as the intention of  the actor(s)  play a
crucial role in the legal determination of the material. Subsequently, two compelling questions
arise: firstly, does 'youth-generated sexual content' constitute illegal material?; and secondly, can
naked  pictures  of  children  uploaded  on  social  media  profiles  by  parents  or  by  themselves
(Ouvrein & Verswijvel, 2019) qualify as child sexual abuse material?
i) 'Youth-generated sexual content'
To  begin  with,  the  possibility  offered  to  Member  States  to  decriminalise  the  production,
possession or acquisition of material which could fall within the scope of the definition of CSAM
on the condition that the children involved have reached the age of sexual consent, the material
is produced and possessed with the consent of those children and only for the private use of the
persons involved, in so far as the acts did not involve any abuse (Article 8 par. 3 of Directive
2011/93),  challenges  the  qualification  of  sexual  images  of  children  as  illegal  under  certain
circumstances.  Thus  far,  the  approach  to  sexual  or  sexually  suggestive  material  depicting
children  has  been  mainly  protectionist  towards  underage  individuals  (Bulger  et  al.,  2017).
However, it is by now a fact reflected in social science research, that children create, possess and
exchange sexual(ised) images or videos of themselves on/through social media platforms and
direct messaging apps as part of the exploration of their sexual identity or as an expression of
sexuality  (De  Ridder,  2017;  Livingstone  &  Mason,  2015;  Walrave,  Van  Ouytsel,  Ponnet,  &
Temple, 2018; Van Ouytsel, Walrave, & Ponnet, 2019). This reality was recognised by the EU
legislator  and  is  reflected  in  Article  8(3)  of  the  Directive  2011/93.  Recital  20  clarifies
that consensual sexual activities in which children are involved may be regarded as the normal
discovery of sexuality in the course of human development, involving new forms of establishing
and maintaining relations among children and adolescents, including through information and
communication technologies, and are not meant to be regulated by the Directive. While sexting
is  by  now  widely  perceived  as  legitimate  behaviour  performed  by  underage  individuals,
whether it also constitutes legal behaviour remains a matter of debate across Europe; research
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shows that a limited number of countries have made use of the legislative exception, while many
more  tend  to  interpret  their  unaltered  criminal  legislation  towards  the  same  direction
(Chatzinikolaou & Lievens, 2020).
It has been argued that 'self-produced digital content captures a sexual 'private moment' and
potentially turns it into a public one' (Quayle & Cariola, 2019). Regardless of one's adherence (or
not) to such a statement, the reference to 'private' and 'public' moments brings to the fore an
important concept: the public or private nature of the act and/or the space which accommodates
it. Decriminalising the production, possession or acquisition of content in cases where children
engage in consensual sexting is more profoundly linked to the exchange of imagery through
direct messaging applications (which often offer the option of encryption) and on a one-to-one
basis.  When discussing  about  online communication  channels  such as  Facebook profiles,  or
Instagram and Snapchat  accounts,  the notion of  online private  or  public  space ought  to  be
revisited. The classification of a space, communication channel or act may influence the level of
privacy expected (Timan et al., 2017), however it is broadly accepted in scholarship that it ought
not be assumed that everything digital is automatically public (Nissenbaum, 2011; Solove, 2007).
Moreover, accepting that existing privacy norms for off-line social interactions help us assess
what  digital  content  should  be  deemed  private  (Nissenbaum,  2011)rationally  leads  to  the
assertion  that  the  digital  capture  of  sexual  or  sexually  suggestive  behaviour  is  also  private
(Hasinoff, A. & Shepherd, T., 2014). Acknowledging that a consensual online sexual act carried
out by children in a (more) private virtual space does not (necessarily) lead to harm and may
constitute a contemporary way of exploring one's sexual identity has brought along a policy
shift (Chatzinikolaou & Lievens, 2019). While social network profiles are accessible to a larger
audience compared to a peer-to-peer - more confidential - communication, the account holder
still remains in control of what information is available to who in the first place (Hasinoff, A. &
Shepherd, T., 2014) by choosing to set up a private over a public account. The account holder,
nonetheless,  may not  fully  control  the  further  circulation  of  the  material  they  produced.  A
parallel,  though,  could  be  drawn  between  private  messaging  spaces  (which  traditionally
accommodate  sexting)  and social  networking profiles  accessible  to  multiple  digital  'friends'.
Against this background, the question rises whether the condition of 'private use' (laid down in
the legislative exception of Article 8(3) of the Directive) is still met when a child chooses to post a
sexual or sexually suggestive image for their online friends to see. It further leads to the question
of whether the risks associated with the wider accessibility of intimate imagery allow for such an
interpretation of the legislative exception. If interpreted broadly, the material would fall outside
the scope of criminalisation (always depending on the transposition of both Articles 2 and 8(3)of
the Directive in the national legislation), and would not qualify as illegal CSAM; subsequently
the online platform would not be legally required to prohibit it.
ii) Nudity
The online  platforms above,  however,  do not  only  restrict  content  portraying  children  in  a
sexual  or  sexually  suggestive  way,  but  also  explicitly  oppose  nude  imagery  of  children  in
general. Whilst some platforms are more illustrative of the type of content considered acceptable
(or not) through examples, others suffice to merely refer to the prohibition of nudity, sexual or
pornographic  imagery.  Facebook,  for  instance,  provides  a  detailed  description  of  what  the
definition of nudity includes, while Snap does not allow nude imagery of children taken by
oneself.
Capturing nude parts of a body may not always carry a sexual element, which is necessary for
the material's classification as illegal CSAM. It might often be the case that parents post and
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share online imagery from their offspring's (especially young children or babies)  private life
(Ouvrein & Verswijvel,  2019;  Steinberg,  2017;  Verswijvel  et  al.,  2019).  Alternatively,  without
having a primarily sexual purpose in mind, children themselves often post images that reveal
their (intimate) body parts. Images taken during summer vacations on the beach or by the pool
or artistic photography that captures the naked body (Ferenc, 2018), however,may not pass the
threshold of acceptable content set by the social network sites. Quite interestingly, in the absence
of a sexual intent on behalf of the creator and distributor of the material, and considering the
rationale  behind the  criminalisation  of  the  production,  possession  or  dissemination  of  child
sexual abuse material (which is combating the abuse of children) as well as the wording of the
exception, such pictures of children taken and made public online by parents or themselves do
not qualify as illegal content. [6]
The realisation of such an inconsistency between legislative imperative and private industry
policy accents the often opaque line between legitimate and legal acts and unavoidably extends
the  discussion  to  socio-cultural  perceptions  of  morality.  Inevitably,  the  acceptability  or
acceptance  of  nudity  in  spaces  perceived  as  public  also  becomes  of  interest.  Creating  and
distributing naked images of oneself online is often perceived as a 'technological, sexual, and
moral  crisis'  (Hasinoff,  2013).  In  fact,  the  level  of  displayed nudity  that  constitutes  risk  for
children has not yet been sufficiently explored in literature (Tariq et al., 2019). By posting sexy or
otherwise body-revealing selfies, young individuals are seen as engaging in intimate edgework
and thus negotiating the societal boundaries of morality/immorality (Hart, 2017).
In addition to the restriction of sexual and nude imagery involving children, platforms' policies
also often prohibit the sexual as well as nude representation of adults. Popular participative
networking platforms tend to forbid sexual or nude pictures of adults, irrespective of whether
the image involves themselves. In most cases, platforms appear to regularly revise their policy
conforming to social  norms and the ethical expectations of their users,  providing them with
more  updated,  detailed,  and nuanced guidelines  (Kuklis,  2019).  As described in  Facebook's
Community Guidelines on nude pictures and adult sexual activity, 'viewing naked or sexual
activity  is  not allowed because some members  of  our community may be sensitive to  such
content'.
Contemporary western cultures  tend to contextualise the exposure of  bodily nakedness and
legitimise it by excluding the sexual element from certain sites or contexts (such as communal
showers or bathing children) (Cover, 2003). However, the definition of 'indecent' material, which
may vary across national legal frameworks, is decisive for the legal classification of the material.
According to the United Kingdom Sentencing Guidelines Council, 'there may be cases where an
image is not posed or 'erotic' but could still be deemed indecent, for example, a naked picture of
a child not engaged in sexual activity but with a focus on the child's genitals' (2013, p. 80). In
general, exceptions to the nudity restriction approach usually relate to a medical, educational,
humorous, artistic or satirical context.Indicatively,Facebook allows for exceptions when images
are posted as a protest, to inform the public for a certain matter, or for educational or medical
purposes; Instagram allows nudity in photos of paintings or sculptures; and YouTube allows
nudity 'when the primary purpose is educational, documentary, scientific, or artistic, and it isn't
gratuitous'. In particular, as highlighted by YouTube, the context in which nudity is portrayed
plays a crucial role in its qualification as acceptable material. It may be the case, alternatively,
that the content is categorised as 'age-restricted' rather than being restricted from the platform
all in all (see YouTube - material including nudity or sexual depiction may also qualify as age-
restricted material).
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At the same time, the restriction seems to be upheld, or at least debated, in cases where the
lawfulness of the activity is  (generally)  not disputed. The most prominent examples are the
widespread prohibition of the representation of female nipples, and the (non-)qualification of
images illustrating females breastfeeding as indecent and restricted material (Locatelli, 2017).
In the former case, the restriction of the visual representation of females' nipples on social media
has sparked an intense public debate on the lopsided treatment of females and males (Acosta,
2016).  The  nudity  ban,  which  exclusively  affects  women,  has  triggered  public  outrage,
demonstrations and campaigns,  such as  the 'Free the Nipple'  movement;  and despite  being
brought to the fore a few years ago, the debate still appears timely (Paul, 2019).
In the latter case, conflicting perceptions were voiced on the application of the nudity restriction
rule by Facebook on images showing females breastfeeding (Khan, 2008). The discourse relates
to a broader debate on whether it is acceptable for females to breastfeed in public (Amidi, 2017;
Doward, 2018), and led to a policy shift on behalf of some social network platforms, including
Facebook and Instagram (Gander, 2014). Albeit users report that in practice the posting of such
imagery  may  still  trigger  their  ban  from  the  Service  (Sampathkumar,  2017),  major  social
networking sites explicitly exempt breastfeeding images from their nudity ban (see Community
Guidelines of Facebook and Instagram).
Subsequently,  it  is  made apparent,  that  a  double standard exists  when assessing acceptable
nudity (in the digital  sphere).  Based on one's  gender,  specific  body-parts  (and subsequently
activities and poses) may take on a sexual connotation; more specifically, while a picture of male
nipples arouses no moral controversy,  capturing female breasts almost intrinsically carries a
sexual element or is otherwise classified as indecent. Moreover, mediated female body parts are
often commodified and receive negative attention in the context of gendered discourses over
sexuality and morality (Ringrose et al.,  2013). Thus, dispatching the sexual element from the
nude representation of a body highly depends on social expectations of modesty attached to
each gender.
Nudity in the online sphere may reflect and reproduce moral norms and discourses of offline
public nudity. In fact,  the restrictions on nudism or public nudity, which appear to be quite
mainstream  across  European  states,  link  such  behaviour  to  criminalised  indecent  exposure,
public indecency, sexual exhibition, disturbances to public order, and threats to public peace (de
Vries, 2019). Similarly, even if imagery depicting a naked body of a child may not be deemed
child sexual abuse material, it might still qualify as illegal material depending on the societal
and legislative tolerance to public nudity.
As the line between legality and illegality in the examples demonstrated above is considerably
thin, online platforms find themselves in the difficult position of assessing the (legal) nature of
such pictures and determining whether allowing them or not blocking access to them would
lead to being held liable. In light of this reality, and taking into account the legitimate risk of
misuse of  content  by third parties  (see,  for  instance,  Van Ouytsel  et  al.,  2017),  the absolute
restriction of sexual, sexually suggestive or nude imagery involving children is considered by
the author a reasonable tactic on behalf of the platforms. The rationale behind the restriction
policies seems to be common across platforms. Despite pictures being shared or posted with the
best of intentions, either by guardians or legal representatives of children or by the children
themselves, nude or semi-nude pictures of children are to be removed owing to the potential of
abuse and in order to avoid being used or owned by others (see Facebook Guidelines on child
nudity and sexual exploitation of children) (O' Neill, 2018).
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Beyond  this  reasoning,  child  imagery  depicting  nudity  or  carrying  a  sexual  element  is  in
principle removed in order to prevent intimate material being shared without authorisation by
the depicted person as well as being perpetually circulated online (Gillespie, 2011). While the
participation  of  children  in  social  networks  is  associated  with  opportunities  and  positive
experiences, digitally mediated online exchanges between children may also carry a number of
(safety) risks (Livingstone, Davidson, & Bryce, 2017; Livingstone, Ólafsson, & Staksrud, 2013;
Van Ouytsel et al., 2018). Even when content has been initially communicated on a consensual
basis and no abuse has taken place, the unauthorised distribution of the material which has been
acquired by that person - either consensually or illegally - is possible. Such exchanges may lead
to secondary victimisation of the child, the adverse consequences of which have been widely
acknowledged in literature over the past two decades (Europol,  n.d.;  Gillespie, 2011, p.  205;
Taylor & Quayle, 2003, p. 194; Van Ouytsel et al., 2017, p. 449).
In light of the ambiguity around the measures they ought to take for tackling illegal content
online (mainly caused by the lack of detailed and more pragmatic guidance offered to platforms
by the European Commission) and the subsequent responsibility they carry pursuant to the
most recent European Commission policy documents (which will be further discussed later on),
restricting  any digital  expression of  sexuality  or  nudity in  respect  of  children  is  a  nuanced
solution. In addition, the absence of a single international definition delineating what constitutes
CSAM  (Gillespie,  2011)perplexes  the  task  of  legally  classifying  material  posted  online  and
accessed  by  users  across  different  countries.  Platforms  tend  to  avoid  making  the  legal
assessment of controversial content which may cause them liability. Meanwhile, as the users of
such social media platforms come from very diverse cultural backgrounds, finding a single set of
rules which would accommodate all social norms and nuances seems quite unrealistic (Kuklis,
2019, p. 9). A case-by-case evaluation of whether a sexual image of a child sent through the
platform to a peer constitutes legal material would be welcome, yet appears difficult. Platforms
have opted out from evaluating the content's (il)legality and adopt a safer - allegedly for both
themselves and children - approach by not allowing any sexual/nude images depicting children
on  the  platform.  However  reasonable  such  a  strategy  may  be,  though,  it  triggers  further
controversy.  As  will  be  analysed  more  thoroughly  below,  applying  a  blanket  ban  on  any
material  depicting  children  nude  or  in  a  sexually  suggestive  manner  without  assessing  its
legality could easily be read as collateral censorship (Sartor, 2017).
4.2.3 ACTUAL VS CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge is usually acquired by platforms through the 'notice-and-action' report mechanisms
in place as well as through the use of automated (algorithmic) content filtering mechanisms (see,
for  instance,  Alghowinem,  2019).  A  hosting  intermediary  may  benefit  from  the  liability
exemption  of  Article  14  as  long  as  it  did  not  have  'actual  knowledge  of  illegal  activity  or
information'  and,  with  reference  to  claims  for  damages,  has  not  been  'aware  of  facts  or
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent' (meaning 'constructive
knowledge').  Upon obtaining  such  knowledge or  awareness,  the  service  provider  is  further
required to act expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the information.
Yet, once again, a crucial condition for determining whether an intermediary shall be held liable
or not for hosting illegal content has sparked criticism. Article 14 establishes a dual standard for
the required level of knowledge when it comes to criminal and civil liability respectively; actual
knowledge  of  illegal  activity  or  information  is  required  for  the  determination  of  criminal
liability, while 'constructive knowledge' is required for the acknowledgement of civil liability.
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The boundary between the two types of acquired knowledge may also be blurred(Kuczerawy,
2018b, p. 62). In fact, national courts still face difficulties interpreting and applying the threshold
of actual knowledge in practice (see, for instance, the Request for a preliminary ruling from the
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 6 November 2018 — LF v Google LLC, YouTube Inc.,
YouTube LLC, Google Germany GmbH,C-682/18).
According to the ruling of the CJEU in L'Oreal v eBay , 'apparent illegality occurs when any
diligent economic operator should have identified the illegality in question'  (paragraph 120).
Along the same lines, during the review process of the E-Commerce Directive, it was proposed
by certain stakeholders, that intermediaries should be only required to remove 'only manifestly
illegal content' (European Commission, 2012).
Regardless of how reasonable such a proposal might be in general terms (Kuczerawy & Ausloos,
2015, p. 242), its application to the context of sexual images of children posted or exchanged
online  may  not  be  as  unencumbered.  Even  though  sexual  images  of  children  are  usually
considered CSAM and therefore constitute illegal material, as elaborated above, exceptions to
this rule might apply. Again, in light of the uncertainty around the legal qualification of sexual
images depicting children, whether  the platform has actual  or  even constructive knowledge
shall not always be sufficiently clear nor easy to determine.
4.3 ONLINE PLATFORMS' FIGHT AGAINST THE CIRCULATION OF CHILD
SEXUAL  ABUSE  MATERIAL:  INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION,
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND INTRINSIC LIMITATIONS
In his very recent report for the Council of Europe, CARR accents the need for multi-disciplinary
collective  action  at  national  and  international  level  to  prevent  and  combat  child  sexual
exploitation  and  abuse  material  (2019).  Cooperation  between  public  and  private  actors  is
similarly promoted by the European Commission (Jaeger, 2019). As a range of stakeholders are
required to take action, the online platforms make their  engagement in fighting against  the
(sexual)  exploitation  and  abuse  of  children  explicit  and  repeatedly  express  'zero  tolerance'
towards  it  or  towards  those  who post,  save  or  distribute  the  material  (see  the  Community
Guidelines  of  Instagram,  Snapchat  and  YouTube).  At  the  same  time,  leading  technology
companies, among which Facebook and Google, support the 'We Protect Global Alliance to End
Child Sexual Exploitation Online' (European Commission, 2016c), the alliance that resulted from
the merge of 'We Protect' (a UK-driven global multi-stakeholder initiative for combating online
child abuse and exploitation, established in 2014) and 'The Global Alliance Against Child Sexual
Abuse' (an alliance launched by the European Commission and the US in 2012) (Baines, 2019;
WeProtect Global Alliance, 2016). However, as social networks transcend geographical national
borders, no matter how necessary international cooperation is, the intrinsic limitations related to
both jurisdictional issues (French Government, 2019, p. 13) and the co-existence of multiple legal
frameworks that may not be fully coherent shall not be overlooked.
It is common practice for platforms to enable users to report material and (other) users that
violate the community guidelines or terms of use of the service (Council of Europe, n.d.). As a
matter of fact, all platforms offer the possibility to report content that violates the terms of use of
the service. Facebook, Instagram, Snap Inc., and YouTube inform their users that upon review of
the report, which is carried out by the competent team appointed by the platform, the finding of
a violation results in the 'taking-down' of the material. In addition, it leads to the seizure of one's
profile and the communication of the violation to law enforcement insofar the behaviour also
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violates the applicable legislation. Without exception, all  above-mentioned platforms refer to
their close collaboration with Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) or (supra)national centres for
reporting child exploitation or abuse. Individuals may be further updated on the prevalence of
such violations and the amount of material that was taken down by the platform through the
annual  reports  on the enforcement  of  the community standards,  issued by some platforms.
Facebook, for instance, regularly issues reports on the enforcement of the platform's guidelines;
according to the latest report, the platform has actioned 5.1 million pieces of content relating to
child nudity and sexual exploitation over the first quarter of 2019 - a number that demonstrates
decrease in comparison to 2018 (Facebook, n.d.-b). The efficiency of their 'notice-and-take down'
policies is, however, often questioned due to the vast amount of illegal content that remains
accessible on the platform (Alexander, 2019).
Reliably  identifying  and  classifying  CSAM  is  significantly  challenging  for  law  enforcement
agencies (Europol, 2017; Kloess et al., 2018), let alone for private enforcement mechanisms. Not
only is it necessary, yet sometimes hard, to determine whether the image depicts a child (Mayer
et al., 2014), but, most importantly, the decision of whether the image is of an indecent nature
(Kloess et al., 2018) may spark additional controversy. According to Gillespie, identifying clearly
indecent  images  may  be  considerably  easy,  yet  defining  less  explicit  images  (for  instance,
identifying the context of an image depicting a partially clothed adolescent) is far more difficult
(2011).  Pornographic  or  nude  image  recognition  mechanisms  employed  by  social  media
platforms rely mainly on trained algorithms (Brennan & Phippen, 2020;  Ion & Minea,  2019;
Shayan et  al.,  2015)  and human moderators  (Van Royen et  al.,  2016).  As  part  of  their  risk
management  strategies  and  their  contribution  to  the  fight  against  the  circulation  of  illegal
content -  including CSAM - private intermediaries engage algorithmic enforcement, thus far
employed by law enforcement authorities (Elkin-Koren & Perel, 2018). Training, however, an
artificial  intelligence  to  tell  apart  nudity  may  not  be  easy  (Stephen,  2019).  Moreover,  in
borderline situations where a sexual focus cannot be directly identified and contextual details
play a pivotal role in determining whether the material is indecent or not, subjective judgment is
necessary (Kloess et al., 2018, p. 177). In such occasions, relying on deep learning for classifying
imagery may fall short of the perplex assessment to be carried out (Brennan & Phippen, 2020).
Existing content filtering solutions for the detection of explicit nudity and pornography, based
for instance on the percentage of skin regions in an image, may not suffice for more context-
specific cases (Ion & Minea, 2019). It thus comes as no surprise that algorithmic content filtering
solutions may erroneously label content as illegal and subsequently remove it from the platform.
In fact, such a margin of error is indirectly acknowledged even by Facebook. As explained in the
November 2019 Community Standards Enforcement Report, while appeals on content that has
been  actioned  for  sexual  exploitation  material  are  not  allowed,  they  were  exceptionally
introduced 'for child nudity violations - such as innocent images of children in the bath'.
To  conclude,  while  intermediaries  seem  well  positioned  to  engage  in  the  fight  against  the
circulation  of  illegal  CSAM by  performing  content  regulation,  the  nature  of  the  content  in
question  makes  their  task  of  classifying  material  depicting  children  in  a  sexual  way  more
challenging and the classification methods deployed vulnerable to criticism.
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 11, Issue 1, 2020                         
4.4  BALANCING  RIGHTS:  EXCESSIVE  COLLATERAL
CENSORSHIP VS LEGITIMATE  RESTRICTION  OF  FREEDOM  OF
EXPRESSION  AND  THE  RIGHT  TO  A  PRIVATE  LIFE VS FREEDOM  TO
CONDUCT BUSINESS
It results from the above, that online platforms tend to restrict more than is strictly required from
them by the legislator.  Even though nude or sexual images of children may not necessarily
constitute illegal CSAM, the knowing hosting of which would trigger the platform's liability,
popular social network and content sharing platforms tend to ban such content entirely and
regardless of the specific circumstances under which it  has been created and shared. In this
section, the focus is put on the posting of imagery by the children themselves, rather than by
third persons, such as their parents. [7]
Whether the enforced restrictions are proportionate merits further exploration, which could in
fact  benefit  from  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  Guidelines  on  assessing  the
proportionality of measures that limit the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of
personal data (2019). Based on the analysis offered in the Guidelines, measures undertaken by
hosting intermediaries ought to be necessary and appropriate (proportionate stricto sensu) in
light of the legitimate aim pursued in order to be held proportionate in a broad sense (Albinati,
2019, p. 8).
The online platforms' nudity and sexual content restriction approach may be justified partly by
the binding and non-binding policy regime on intermediary liability, which sparks considerable
legal uncertainty, and partly by their freedom to conduct business and to shape their platform's
profile within the digital sphere. In either case, though, there does exist a high risk of collateral
censorship and  (disproportionate)  interference  with  the  platform  user's freedom  of
expression and right  to  private  life .  Performing  a  balancing  exercise  might  prove  quite
challenging,  yet  reflecting  on  the  competing  rights  already  brings  to  the  fore  possible
shortcomings of the legal framework and/or the private industry's initiatives. Contemporary
forms of intimate peer interaction (sexting) (Smahel et al., 2020, p. 82) or self-expression through
image creation (be it sexually suggestive, artistic or merely informative of one's activities and
daily life) call for a reconsideration of existing policies.
Without doubt,  online platforms play a crucial  societal  role in enabling communication and
exchanges between peers in the digital environment and safeguarding internet users' ability to
freely express and explore their identity (Heins, 2013). It has by now been both established in
literature  (Livingstone  et  al.,  2018;  Walrave,  Van  Ouytsel,  Ponnet,  &  Temple,  2018)  and
acknowledged at a policy level (see Directive 2011/93 Article 8(3); Chatzinikolaou & Lievens,
2020), that the engagement of children in the practice of sexting amounts to a legitimate form of
sexual  exploration.  As  children  create  and  explore  new  forms  of  expression  and  intimate
communication with peers through social media platforms, it is not only the loss of freedom of
expression they fear of, but also the limitation of their intertwined right to privacy (van der
Zwaan et al., 2014; Van Royen et al., 2016, p. 39). According to literature and international case
law [8], intimate decisions, primarily of a sexual nature (Koops et al., 2016), as well as activities
that occur in both public and private spaces and encompass sensitive issues such as [..] sexual
preferences (Finn et al., 2013) fall within the rather elusive concept of privacy. Sharing intimate
imagery or texts of sexual nature remains vital for an individual's self-development and self-
determination (Koops et al., 2016), and so platforms' users maintain the right to protect personal
information from being monitored. Besides the international protection of the individuals' right
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to freedom of expression and right to private life (European Convention on Human Rights,
Articles 10 and 8, and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 11 and 7),
children merit special protection on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child. In particular, pursuant to Articles 6(2), 13 and 16, children hold the right to determine
their self-presentation by exercising control over their image, as their rights to development,
freedom  of  expression,  and  privacy  are  guaranteed.  Besides  discourses  around agency,  the
choice of making sexualised or nude images of oneself accessible to peers is often attributed to
sexualised mass media representations (Hasinoff,  2013),and double standards around female
(and in particular underage girls') sexuality have been detected by a number of scholars (Cooper
et al., 2016; Ringrose et al., 2013; Tolman, 2012). Within feminist scholarship, debates still exist
over the digital representation of female bodies and sexuality, and over whether it results in the
sexual  objectification  of  the  female  body  or  flags  the  sexual  liberation  and  agency  of  girls
(Ringrose et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the creation and communication of sexualised imagery by
adolescents is undoubtedly associated with (risky) opportunities (Livingstone et al., 2017).
Restricting nudity and sexual representations involving children could be partly underpinned
by the enhanced responsibilities enforced upon online platforms by the European Commission
as part of its strategy to actively involve intermediaries in the fight against illegal content online.
Despite the publication of the Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content
online  (2018)  and  the  Communication  on  Tackling  Illegal  Content  Online  (2017),  what  is
expected from the online platforms remains quite vague. The way in which they interpret the
assumed duties of care in protecting children is to some extent left to their discretion or, in some
countries, is elucidated by the national courts' (detailed) evaluation of the preventive measures
or overall duty of care that can be imposed on platforms (see, for instance, Germany) (Ullrich,
2017). How they may accomplish their role as contributors to the fight against CSAM highly
depends on the business model, the technological and economic capacity of the intermediary,
and the perception of the ethical responsibilities to be met towards society as a whole and the
platforms' (potential) users in particular (Sartor, 2017, p. 31; Taddeo & Floridi, 2017).
As  stated in  literature,  the  legal  quality  and  the  social  value  of  legal  regulations  imposing
sanctions on certain types of communications (in our case, sexual images depicting children),
shall be evaluated on the basis of both the extent to which harmful, illegal content is removed or
blocked and on the extent to which 'it does not deter lawful communication' (Sartor, 2017, p. 12).
Objections to the posting of a nude or sexual(ly suggestive) image of a child where no abuse has
taken place may be justified by a legitimate fear of misuse by third parties (Quayle & Cariola,
2019;  Wolak et  al.,  2018).  Nonetheless,  the line between legitimate restriction of  freedom of
expression and unwanted censorship is thin (Kuczerawy, 2018; Sartor, 2017).
Allowing social network platforms and other digital platforms to restrict such imagery could on
the one hand be a welcomed interpretation of platforms' imposed responsibility to tackle illegal
content online (Myers West, 2018). Yet a ban as broad as those described above may arguably be
seen  as  the  'privatisation  of  censorship'  (Etzioni,  2019;  Heins,  2013,  p.  325)  and  thus  be
unwanted. The 'self-regulated' removal and blocking models adopted by private companies are
reasonably criticised as resulting in censorship 'without the usual constitutional safeguards that
apply to public authorities' (McIntyre, 2011; Nair, 2019, p. 107).
In parallel, social network and content sharing platforms are meant to allow for users to share
content from their  everyday lives,  be it  images of a child itself  or one's  child on the beach,
images from a child's christening or the depiction of art representing a nude child which one
wishes to post online.
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To the extent  that  platforms choose to  restrict  content  which  constitutes  a  legitimate act  of
personal (sexual) expression, they may be partially failing to strike a fair balance between their
societal role as online communication facilitators and protectors of children.
5. Conclusions
Sexual  images  of  children  can  be  found  posted  online  on  content  sharing  or  social  media
platforms. While it  could often be the case that the material is the result of sexual abuse or
coercion of the depicted child, evidence shows that imagery that depicts children in a sexualised
way  may  as  well  constitute  a  contemporary  form  of  exploration  of  sexuality  and  sexual
communication performed by the children themselves.  Alternatively,  the posting of imagery
featuring nude body parts of children may be void of any (underlying) sexual element; it might
be  parents  willing  to  share  private  family  moments  including  a  somewhat  more  revealing
representation  of  their  underage  offspring  or  children  who  have  chosen  to  share  content
including (semi) nudity.
The popular online platforms looked into, namely Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat and YouTube,
seem to adopt a quite uniform approach towards imagery depicting children in a sexual way;
not only child sexual abuse material, but also nude representations of children are restricted. As
noticed, no platform in the analysed sample appears to make any distinction between content
posted by a third person or the depicted child itself  nor assesses the material  based on the
existence (or not) of a sexual purpose. Similarly, specific contextual circumstances seem to play a
limited role in the classification process.
The adopted policies partly result from the legal obligations set out by the binding and non-
binding EU regime on intermediaries' liability and on the combat against CSAM. However, the
platforms' policies reflect a tendency to restrict more than is legally required from them. Central
to this ascertainment is, in fact, the legal definition of CSAM and the following qualification of
content  as  illegal.  Though  the  determination  of  what  constitutes  illegal  CSAM  might  be
challenging  owing  to  the  cross-border  operation  of  such  intermediaries  and  the  diverse
definitions adopted by national legislators, at the EU level and pursuant to the Directive 2011/93
there needs to exist a primarily sexual purpose behind the depiction of a child's sexual organs or
the capture of explicit sexual conduct.
This active policy choice could be justified by a number of  reasons.  Firstly,  the wording of
Article  14  of  the  E-Commerce  Directive,  the  key  provision  of  the  EU intermediary  liability
regime  which  affords  a  conditioned  liability  exemption  to  hosting  intermediaries,  creates
uncertainty as to its scope and applicability. Similarly, parallel to the EU tendency to enhance
online platform's responsibility in tackling illegal content online, both the E-Commerce Directive
and  the  non-binding  policy  instruments  issued  by  the  European  Commission  allow  online
platforms a margin to adopt measures that meet the imposed responsibility. The uncertainty as
regards the triggering of liability, if the platform abstains from removing or blocking the access
to sexual material depicting children, rationalises the 'better safe than sorry' risk management
strategy  taken  up  by  the  intermediaries.  In  other  words,  the  lingering  unclarity  and  legal
uncertainty justifiably causes over-enforcement and highlights the need for and significance of
additional policy guidance.
This absolute restriction of online nudity and sexual representation of children is intrinsically
linked to social, cultural, and moral anxieties (Lee et al., 2013)and the consequent challenge in
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distinguishing  indecent  (or  harmful)  content  from  what  ought  to  be  labelled  as socially
acceptable.
While a sexualised media culture that influences the social norms of underage peer (intimate)
communication  and  self-representation  is  widely  acknowledged,  what  is  considered  'age-
appropriate'  behaviour  is  still  debated across  different  countries  and different  cultures.  The
classification of intimate material depicting children may be largely subjective and immensely
challenging in light of diverse societal and moral narratives and the importance of contextual
circumstances. Due to such innate difficulties, the efficiency of automated filtering enforcement
mechanisms deployed by private industry cannot but come into question. And no matter how
understandable  the  'better  safe  than  sorry'  approach  is,  it  inevitably  gives  rise  to  further
controversy and the burning question: Is the interference with children's right to privacy, self-
representation and freedom of expression proportionate/proportionately  legal? Filtering and
monitoring content (by automatic means or human resources) might be desirable as pursuing a
legitimate aim, yet safeguarding children's autonomy rights in the digital environment is pivotal
(Council of Europe, 2018; Van Royen et al., 2015). Navigating between protection and freedom of
children when the issue at stake associates with elements such as gender, morality, and culture,
inherently  perplexes  the  performed  balancing  and  cannot  guarantee  easy  public  policy  or
private  industry  solutions.  As  aptly  put  by  Ringrose,  Harvey,  Gill,  and  Livingstone, 'What
would it mean for us to live in a world where teen girls could unproblematically take, post or
send an image of their breasts to whomever they wished?' (2013).
With the minimum age of criminal responsibility ranging from 10 to 16(European Union Agency
for Fundamental Rights, 2018a)and the age of sexual consent usually set between 14 and 16
across the EU(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018b), one may wonder why
underage individuals are not allowed to capture their naked body (be it in a sexualised way or
not) and make it accessible to their online peers. Thus far, notwithstanding the legal nature of
the  activity  portrayed,  the  intentions  behind  it,  the  context  of  the  imagery,  and  children's
awareness of the risks associated with sharing intimate content online, it seems that the limited
ability to control what happens next overrides children's agency rights. Whether our society can
afford and is  willing to accept  nude or sexualised imagery depicting children online,  in  an
environment baring risks, pertains to our conceptual understanding of (online) 'public space'
and our tolerance towards intimate forms of self-expression coming from underage individuals.
In any event, so long as the EU regime on intermediary liability is not revised to accommodate
the  way  in  which  online  intermediaries  operate  today  and  no  sufficient  guidelines  on  the
measures to be taken by online platforms in their fight against illegal sexual imagery of children
exist, online platforms have no other choice but to shape their policies based on popular cultural
norms, their business plan, and their understanding of how sensitive content should be dealt
with.
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